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A variety of laws regulate, tax, or prohibit risky activities. A number of these laws are pater-nalistic in the sense that they seek to protect the willing participants in these activities rather than prevent harm to third parties. Likewise, paternalistic concern for donors’ welfare is a key motivation for stringent reg-
ulation of living kidney donation. 
Although living kidney donation is a common medical proce-
dure and donors usually enjoy a full recovery, the loss of a kidney 
poses long-term health risks, in particular that of renal failure if 
the donor’s remaining kidney fails. In the United States and most 
every other country (with the notable exception of Iran), kidney 
donation is permitted but financial compensation for donors is 
prohibited. Not only is there no legal market for kidneys, donors 
in the United States are often not even reimbursed for their full 
out-of-pocket cost in making the donation. 
The ban on compensation may protect potential donors from 
the temptation of easing their financial situation by giving up a 
kidney, a choice they may regret in later years. But this regulation 
has dire consequences.
The need for transplantable kidneys is great, far exceeding cur-
rent availability from deceased and living donations. The official 
waiting list of Americans with renal failure is now approximately 
100,000, with a typical wait time of five years or more. Those on 
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The risks are lower and the screening process more rigorous for kidney donors.
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the waiting list are kept alive by dialysis, which is both costly to 
taxpayers (because Medicare pays for a large percentage of the costs) 
and debilitating to the patients. Even with dialysis, thousands of 
renal-failure patients die each year for want of a suitable kidney.
This wait could be largely eliminated by easing the current ban 
on compensation for donors. An adequate supply of living donors 
would be especially valuable because living donors tend to provide 
higher quality kidneys with greater opportunity for developing a 
close tissue match, thus reducing the chance of rejection. Current 
estimates suggest that if compensation were permitted, the cost 
of payments for recruiting an adequate number of donors would 
be substantially less than the savings from reducing the number 
of renal patients on dialysis at government expense. 
In this article we contrast the compensation ban on organ 
donation with the legal treatment of football and other violent 
sports in which both acute and chronic injuries to participants are 
common. While there is some debate about how best to regulate 
these sports in order to reduce the risks, there appears to be no 
debate about whether participants should be paid. For the best 
adult football players, professional contracts worth multiple mil-
lions of dollars are the norm. A ban on professionalism in football 
would be the end of the National Football League, which is cur-
rently the highest grossing sports league in the world; the NFL 
collected $13 billion in revenue in 2016 and each of the 32 teams 
has a market value of anywhere from $1.6 billion to $4.8 billion. 
While the recent evidence on the long-term medical damage 
from concussion has caused widespread concern, there is no 
prominent voice calling for a ban on professional football. Indeed, 
a ban is unthinkable in the foreseeable future. That observation 
helps illustrate the importance of history, custom, and established 
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interests in shaping the debate over regulating risky activity. But 
if we could start fresh, the current configuration of activities for 
which compensation is banned would seem very odd.
If ethical concerns persuade thoughtful people that the “right” 
answer is to ban compensation for kidney donation, then the 
same logic would suggest that compensation should also be 
banned for participation in violent sports. If the “right” answer is 
to permit compensation for participation in violent sports, then 
compensation for kidney donation 
should also be permitted. We see 
no logical basis for the current 
combination of banning com-
pensation for kidney donors 
while allowing compensation 
for football players and boxers. 
THE RISKS TO  
PARTICIPANTS
Each year in the United States, 
6,000 people donate a kidney, 
voluntarily and without compensation for assuming the medical 
risks from surgery and living with just one kidney. We compare 
those risks with the risks stemming from participation in violent 
sports that do not ban inducements for participation at the high-
est level. Although the comparison is not perfect, we provide some 
statistics that suggest that a man who signs a contract to play in 
the NFL for a year is consenting to be exposed to far greater medical 
risks than someone who volunteers to donate a kidney. 
Kidney donation / The immediate risks from surgery can be briefly 
summarized. A systematic review and meta-analysis of the lit-
erature found that there were post-operative complications in 
7.3% of cases, which the authors deemed a “low complication 
rate.” Complications included wound infection (1.6%) and bleed-
ing (1.0%). A questionnaire study of donors three months 
after their operation found that 18.5% rated their overall 
health as “somewhat worse” than before, suggesting 
that over 80% had fully recovered in a subjective sense. 
The most serious outcome, death, is quite rare. A study 
of 80,347 donors over the period 1994–2009 determined 
that there had been 25 deaths, for a rate of 3.1 per 10,000 
operations. That is about twice as high as the annual 
chance of being killed in a motor vehicle accident for 
the most relevant age group (45–64) during that period. 
Following recovery, donors typically do not suffer 
disability related to the loss of their remaining kid-
ney because one functioning kidney does everything 
required for normal functioning of the body. The long-
term mortality risk was no higher for living donors 
than for age- and comorbidity-matched participants in 
a large longitudinal health survey (NHANES III). Simi-
larly, an analysis of 3,368 donors age 55 and over found 
no difference in all-cause mortality in comparison with a 
matched sample from the Health in Retirement Survey. 
The only exception to this null conclusion is a study 
of Norwegian donors that found a divergence in the 
mortality rates after 10 years, so that by 25 years 18% of 
the donors had died compared with 13% of the matched 
controls. A recent review article confirms that there is no dif-
ference in death rates for at least the first 10 years, and that the 
Norwegian study’s conclusion of divergence after that has not 
been replicated. 
What about the particular threat that a donor’s remain-
ing kidney will fail, which in the absence of an immediate 
transplant would mean that the donor will have to go on 
dialysis? The best study of donors in the United States 
found a higher cumulative incidence of failure and 
end stage renal disease (ESRD) for donors than 
non-donors, 0.31% versus 0.04%. While the risk 
is significantly elevated for donors, it remains 
very low in an absolute sense, representing an 
increased risk of about 1 in 400.
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Finally, a questionnaire study of 2,455 donors who were 
between five and 48 years from their surgery found that 84% 
were satisfied with their lives. The likelihood of satisfaction was 
enhanced by the donors’ feeling that their gift had positive effects 
on their relationships.
Football / One challenge in making a meaningful comparison 
between the risks entailed in kidney donation and the risks 
entailed in participation in contact sports is that the latter may 
stretch out for many years and involve not one choice (donate or 
not) but a series of choices regarding participation. The young 
men who are drafted into the NFL each year have almost all 
played organized football for a number of years, including in 
high school and college, and have been exposed to the risk of 
injury throughout. Various comparisons of football with the 
single act of donation may be possible, such as “play in one game” 
or “play for one season.” But given that our focus is on induce-
ments, we take a somewhat different approach and focus on the 
risks associated with a professional career as the unit of account. 
Rough physical contact is part of the game of football and 
injuries are common from an early age. For boys less than 20 years 
old, football, among all the sports and other types of recreational 
activities, is the most common cause of injury requiring a trip to 
the emergency room. An analysis of emergency room visits for 
2001–2009 estimated there were 350,000 youths per year treated 
for football injuries, almost all males.
Of these, 25,000 were treated for non-fatal traumatic brain 
injuries (TBI), typically concussion, of which over half (13,667) were 
males age 15–19. About 1.5 million males in this age group played 
organized tackle football in 2009, and if we can assume that most 
of the injuries affected those rather than youths playing pick-up 
games, the treated TBI injury rate was close to 1%. The overall rate 
is probably much higher because most concussions are not treated.
An alternative set of national estimates links concussion risk to 
game exposure for school football teams. The authors’ estimates 
suggest that over the course of a 10-game playing season, a high 
school player would have a 1.55% chance of being concussed and 
a college player a 3.0% chance. These statistics are somewhat out 
of date and there has been a strong upward trend in reported 
concussions in organized football—in part because of the national 
“Heads Up” campaign initiated by the Centers for Disease Control 
in 2004, increased media attention, and the passage of youth 
sports concussion laws in all 50 states. These laws specify that 
young players with possible concussions must be removed from 
the game and cleared for return by a set protocol.
A recent report by Harvard Law School found that in 2016, the 
2,274 active players in the NFL experienced 2,066 injuries during 
the preseason and regular season, in which “injury” is defined as 
an event recorded by the team trainer that would typically require 
time lost from practice or game. Of those injuries, 244 were con-
cussions, which works out to 0.073 concussions per player-season. 
At 7.3%, that is over twice the rate for college players and about 
equal to the rate of surgical complications in kidney donation. 
A recent study of “life after football” brings together the official 
injury reports and survey information to paint a grim picture. The 
authors report that 93% of former NFL players missed at least 
one game as a result of injury and half had three or more major 
injuries, often requiring surgery. For a substantial majority, inju-
ries ended their career or contributed to the decision to end their 
career. Nine of 10 former players have nagging aches and pains 
from football when they wake up, and for most the pain lasts all 
day. For those age 30–49, the ability to work is impaired by injury. 
But what has garnered considerable recent attention and con-
cern is the high percentage of former players who have chronic 
traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) by the time they die. CTE is a 
progressive neurodegeneration associated with repetitive head 
trauma, with a variety of symptoms: impulsivity, depression, 
apathy, anxiety, explosivity, episodic memory loss, and attention 
and executive function problems. A recent postmortem study of 
a sample of donated brains of former NFL players found that 
110 of 111 indicated either mild or (more commonly) severe CTE. 
Interviews with family members found that behavior, mood, and 
cognitive symptoms were common among this group.
These findings do not imply that 99% of former NFL players 
will have CTE. The brains in this study were voluntarily submitted 
for examination by family members who were often motivated by a 
desire to know the cause of their loved ones’ dementia or other neu-
rological problems—which is to say, the brains of those who died 
without such problems may be largely missing from the sample. 
But the 111 brains do represent 8.5% of the 1,300 former NFL 
players who died during the period that these brains were donated. 
That places something of a logical lower bound on the prevalence 
of CTE. Presumably the true prevalence is much higher than 8.5%. 
The other problem with these remarkable findings is that they 
do not provide a direct indication of the cause or causes of the CTE 
and associated disabilities. Repetitive head trauma is recognized as 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for CTE. The subjects had 
been exposed to repetitive head trauma throughout their careers 
as football players, which typically would have started in high 
school or well before. In fact, there is some evidence that age at first 
exposure to football may be related to the likelihood of impaired 
cognitive performance by former football players. Elite players who 
choose to go professional following college likely increase their 
chances of neurological problems in later life, which are already 
high as a result of their exposure up to that point. Unfortunately, 
the science does not provide a basis for sorting out the additional 
contribution of an NFL career to this health burden. 
While it is not possible to do a precise “apples to apples” com-
parison of the medical risks associated with kidney donation and 
the risks associated with a professional football career, it seems 
clear that the acute risk of injury and of long-term disability are 
far higher for the football player. As discussed above, most NFL 
veterans live out their lives following retirement with serious physi-
cal and mental disabilities. The vast majority of kidney donors lead 
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entirely normal lives following recovery from the initial operation. 
THE LIMITS OF CONSENT 
Ordinarily, people are born with two kidneys but they only need 
one to sustain full health. For that reason, adults can donate 
a kidney and, after recovering from the operation, expect their 
life span and health will not be much affected. Still, as explained 
above, there are risks entailed in the operation, and the loss of 
redundancy in kidney function may cause medical problems in 
later life if a donor is unlucky enough to suffer kidney failure. 
Concern for the potential kidney donor’s welfare motivates a 
variety of restrictions on donation, including a ban on financial 
compensation. This ban is paternalistic: it deprives donors of 
compensation in part because the allure of a financial payoff may 
cause some people to choose to donate against what might be 
considered, given the risks, their “true” best interests. 
Is that restriction justified? Whether and when sane, sober, well-
informed adults should be banned by government authority from 
choosing to engage in an activity that risks their own life and limb 
is an ancient point of contention. There are a variety of hazardous 
activities that are permitted with no legal bar to receiving compensa-
tion. Included on this list are such occupations as logging, roofing, 
commercial fishing, and military service. Also included are violent 
sports such as football, boxing, and mixed martial arts. These exam-
ples illustrate a broad endorsement of the principle that consenting 
adults should be allowed to exchange (in a probabilistic sense) their 
physical health and safety for financial compensation, even in some 
instances in which the ultimate product is simply entertainment. 
The Harm Principle and external effects / In the search for a princi-
pled basis for setting legal boundaries on self-hazardous choices, 
a natural starting point is the tenet that adult choices that do 
not hurt others should be allowed by government. This Harm 
Principle was developed by John Stuart Mill in his classic treatise 
On Liberty (1859). It provides a rationale for the view that adults 
in the possession of their faculties should be free to choose to 
engage in risky activities if that choice does not harm others 
who are not part of the bargain. In this view, paternalistic regula-
tions—those imposed for the individual’s own good—should be 
limited to restrictions on children or on adults who are not in a 
position to make free and well-informed choices.
While the Harm Principle appears to create a broad scope for 
individual autonomy, governments limit autonomy if negative 
external effects are considered problematic. Most individuals are 
enmeshed in a web of sentiment and responsibility to family mem-
bers, neighbors, coworkers, and others. Thus, a risky choice that 
results in injury or death will tend to have harmful consequences 
for other people, including those who had no direct authority or 
influence over that choice. Furthermore, third-party effects are 
created by participation in private and government insurance 
programs and eligibility for safety-net programs in which any 
financial costs (for medical care, for example) are broadly shared. 
In the case of living kidney donation, the direct external effects 
include considerable surplus of benefit over cost. Enhancing the 
quality and quantity of kidneys available for transplantation 
would reduce disability and save lives among patients while also 
saving the cost (to taxpayers) of maintaining these patients on 
dialysis. Hence for kidney donation—unlike, say, dueling or box-
ing (or a great variety of other risky activities)—it appears that the 
external effects are far more positive than negative. 
Cognitive biases and limitations / The belief that adults are able to 
discern and act on their true interests when faced with complex 
choices is basic to Mill’s argument for freedom from government 
interference. During the last half-century, economists and behav-
ioral scientists have explored the limitations and biases in decision-
making, demonstrating that even sane and sober adults tend to 
make systematic errors. When the stakes are high, as they are in 
choosing to donate a kidney or play professional football, even a 
free-choice advocate may accept that some limits are warranted. 
Here we very briefly consider the relevant issues and conclude 
that if the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) were 
amended to allow payments to donors, potential kidney donors 
could be protected against being unduly tempted through the 
existing structure of screening, counseling, and delay. In contrast, 
it is not clear that NFL recruits have similar protections in place.
In the ideal, a rational person faced with an important decision 
(donate a kidney, sign a contract to play professional football) 
would want to proceed as a decision analyst would instruct. The 
goal is to combine the objective consequences of the option with 
the individual’s subjective valuation of those consequences, includ-
ing timing (now versus later) and likelihood. This rational person 
might go about making her decision using the following the exercise:
■■ List all possible consequences over one’s lifetime. 
■■ Estimate the probability of each consequence.
■■ Assess the utility gain or loss of each consequence according 
to the decision-maker’s own preferences.
■■ Calculate whether the expected value in terms of utility 
gains and losses is positive.
Needless to say, that is not how such decisions are made in 
practice, although in the case of kidney donation (and not foot-
ball) much of the relevant information will at least be provided as 
part of the counseling required of potential donors. The difficulty 
of making an informed decision is greater because the decider can 
only go down that path once.
The issue is actually not whether individuals should be trusted 
to act like well-informed decision analysts, but rather whether 
they could benefit from legal restrictions on the menu of pos-
sibilities available to them. This challenge has become better 
focused as research in behavioral science has documented the 
tendency of adults to make systematic errors in their decisions. 
Much of this research has focused on choices that have uncertain 
outcomes, or outcomes that are distributed over time, or require 
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the decisionmaker to predict her sense of well-being under the 
scenarios implied by the available choices. For example, people 
tend to discount the value of delayed consequences according to 
how far in the future they would be experienced and can make 
sensible choices between prospects that offer a payoff in one year 
or a larger payoff in two years. However, prospects with immediate 
payoffs are often tempting out of proportion to their objective 
value and induce impulsive choices that are later regretted.
It is helpful to deconstruct the decision to donate a kidney 
under both the current regime (no compensation) and a hypo-
thetical regime (in which the donor would be financially com-
pensated). Living donation is an arduous process that would not 
be undertaken by a well-informed person without a substantial 
reward of some sort (whether monetary or emotional). Under the 
current regime, only about 6,000 living donors volunteer each year. 
Almost all of them specify who is to receive their kidney, and as 
a consequence the donor has the satisfaction of saving the life 
of a family member or friend, and presumably enjoys the recipi-
ent’s gratitude as well. Potential donors undergo screening, both 
medical and psychological. While donors do not have to pay the 
expense of the screening and operation, they may have lost earn-
ings at the time that are not reimbursed. If they experience medi-
cal consequences years later, no financial help will be forthcoming 
from the beneficiaries of their gift or the kidney-donation system. 
Everything about this process leans against making an impul-
sive decision to donate. Indeed, those who choose to become a 
donor may typically see it as an obligation rather than an oppor-
tunity. They may be under pressure from family members or may 
not see any acceptable alternative to the unpleasant prospect of 
donating. There is nothing of the “temptation” in this scenario, 
given the delays, the counseling, and the fact that much of the 
pain and risk precede the usually rewarding event of donation. 
If the system for screening potential donors were preserved, but 
now with the possibility of compensation (for the sake of argu-
ment, say, worth $50,000) then many more donors would come 
forward, especially for non-directed donations. For the additional 
donors, the payment would be a stronger incentive than the psy-
chic rewards of a pure altruistic act. (In fact, in this regime some 
would-be family donors may decide to refrain, given the knowledge 
that other suitable kidneys are available.) The increase in dona-
tions would save many lives and reduce costs to taxpayers. But the 
question remains of whether the promise of payment would tend 
to encourage donations that are not in the donors’ true interest 
as a decision analyst would define that interest. 
For the potential donor, the prospect of financial reward may 
overcome concerns about the temporary pain and disability, the 
slight risk of death stemming from the operation, as well as the 
small probability of medical problems years or decades later. There is 
nothing intrinsically irrational about a willingness to assume medical 
risk in exchange for a substantial amount of money. But the quality 
of the choice may be influenced by the sequence of events. If donors 
were offered a $50,000 check on the day that they volunteered to 
donate, but did not have to actually go on the operating table for a 
year, impulsive, ill-considered donations might be the norm. But the 
disproportionate temptation of an immediate payoff could be man-
aged if the payment were not made until after the operation, which 
in the normal course of events would take weeks or even months 
while the donor underwent screening and matching. 
The delayed payoff would have the effect of protecting potential 
donors against impulsive decisions while respecting their underlying 
preferences for the value of the money vis-à-vis the medical risks 
of donation. The delay is in the spirit of the “nudge” approach to 
policy design popularized by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. It 
is in contrast to a paternalistic approach that denies the validity of 
the donor’s preferences. A recent survey, for example, found a sizable 
group that thought it was unacceptable to offer potential subjects 
in a risky medical experiment compensation of as much as $10,000. 
The authors speculated that these respondents thought that a large 
payoff would induce people to participate who placed “too much” 
value on money (or too little on their health). These respondents 
were in effect privileging their own values over those of others. 
The same concerns that apply to the quality of kidney donor 
decisions also apply to the decision to sign a contract to play in 
the NFL. Players are given little information about the risks. The 
longer-term risks (including the risk of CTE in middle age) have 
not been well quantified but appear to be far higher than for 
kidney donation. The payoff in both financial terms and status 
is also very high and immediate. Any counseling or screening that 
might occur is up to the player to pursue.
Exploitation, coercion, race, and class / Living kidney donors in 
the United States have above-average incomes (after adjusting 
for sex and age), perhaps as one reflection of the financial losses 
experienced by donors. In a new regime in which donors were 
paid a substantial fee, it is predictable that the influx of vol-
unteers would have below-average incomes. The prospect of 
financially stressed individuals attempting to make ends meet by 
“selling” a kidney raises a red flag for some ethicists. 
A compensation regime would expand the choice set for those 
in comfortable circumstances, but those in desperate circum-
stances might feel compelled to sell a kidney; in that sense, the 
option of selling could be seen as “coercive.” Furthermore, a sys-
tem that in part depended on the poor to supply kidneys could be 
seen as “exploiting” the poor. This line of thought is represented 
in a 2001 report of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
about paid participation in medical experiments: 
Benefits threaten … the voluntary nature of the choice, … raise 
the danger that the potential participant’s distributional 
disadvantage could be exploited [and] … lead some prospective 
participants to enroll … when it might be against their better 
judgment and when otherwise they would not do so.
We believe that using words like “coercion” and “exploitation” 
to characterize the introduction of a new option by which poor 
SPRING 2018 / Regulation / 17
people (and others) could earn a substantial amount of money 
provides more heat than light to this situation. Just because living 
donors would have lower incomes than current donors does not 
support a ban on compensation, which in fact limits the options 
available to the poor and thereby makes a bad situation (their 
lack of marketable assets) worse. But for anyone not persuaded 
by this argument, we note that these social justice concerns apply 
with at least equal force to compensating boxers; most American 
professional boxers were raised in lower-income neighborhoods 
and are either black or Hispanic.
As more has become known about the dangers of repeated 
head trauma, similar arguments regarding football have become 
more prominent. About 70% of NFL players are black, and Pacific 
Islanders are also overrepresented as compared to the American 
population. Accordingly, much attention has been paid to the 
concussion crisis as a race and class problem. As one observer 
recently noted, “What’s a little permanent brain damage when 
you’re facing a life of debilitating poverty?” In reality, however, 
NFL players are better educated themselves, and come from better 
educated homes, than is average for Americans, in part because 
the NFL typically recruits college students. Still, some NFL players, 
like some would-be kidney donors, come from poverty. 
CONCLUSION
Our claim is that there is a stronger case for compensating kidney 
donors than for compensating participants in violent sports. If 
this proposition is accepted, one implication is that there are 
only three logically consistent positions: allow compensation 
for both kidney donation and for violent sports; allow compen-
sation for kidney donation but not for violent sports; or allow 
compensation for neither. Our current law and practice is per-
verse in endorsing a fourth regime: allowing compensation for 
violent sports but not kidney donation.
As to social justice concerns, we offer both a direct response 
and a response by analogy with violent sport. A fundamental 
norm of our culture and legal tradition is to respect the choices of 
(sane, sober, well informed, adult) individuals. That norm serves 
to limit government interference with private choices. It is sup-
ported by the right to liberty from undue government interference. 
A well-developed organ procurement process in the American 
system seeks to ensure that potential donors are fully capable of 
making a good decision. Potential kidney donors are not only 
provided with full information, but also screened for mental and 
physical disability. While there is the possibility of “mistakes” (a 
decision to donate against the true best interests of the individual) 
under a compensated system, the screening, consent process, and 
delays should minimize the chance for the kind of errors that 
behavioral economics has demonstrated are common. Under 
such circumstances, the opportunity to be paid for donating a 
kidney is not exploitative or coercive, but rather welfare-enhancing.
We also argue by analogy with professional football, boxing, 
and other legal but violent sports. The medical risks to a profes-
sional career in these sports are much greater both in the near and 
long term than the risks of donating a kidney. On the other hand, 
the consent and screening process in professional sports is not 
as developed as in kidney donation. The social justice concerns 
stem from the fact that most players are black and some come 
from impoverished backgrounds. In sum, the arguments against 
compensating kidney donors apply with equal or greater force to 
compensating athletes in these sports.
 Note that these arguments focus on the donors’ welfare and 
ignore the welfare of people in need of a kidney. A comprehensive 
evaluation of amending NOTA to allow compensation requires 
that both groups be considered. Such an evaluation, conducted by 
P.J. Held and colleagues, reached the following conclusion about a 
regime in which living donors were offered enough compensation 
($45,000) to end the kidney shortage: 
From the viewpoint of society, the net benefit from saving thou-
sands of lives each year and reducing the suffering of 100,000 
more receiving dialysis would be about $46 billion per year, 
with the benefits exceeding the costs by a factor of 3. In addi-
tion, it would save taxpayers about $12 billion each year.
The present value of this flow of social benefits would exceed 
$1.3 trillion.
As far as we know, there has been no cost–benefit analysis of 
the analogous reform in football, namely to ban professional 
compensation. But a first cut is the market value of NFL teams 
because that value reflects the present value of future ticket sales 
and broadcast payments, net of costs, under the current legal 
regime. Presumably a ban on compensation would end profes-
sional football and drive the value of the 32 current teams to zero. 
That current value, according to Forbes, is about $56 billion. That 
amount should be modified to take account of subsidies by host 
cities, and in the other direction to take account of consumer 
surplus, but regardless it is clear that the monetized value of 
allowing compensation for professional football players is far less 
than for allowing compensation for kidney donors. 
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